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Abstract
In this paper we address the question of deterministic cycles in a Ram-
sey model with heterogeneous inﬁnite-lived agents and borrowing constraints,
augmented to take into account the case of elastic labor supply. Under usual
restrictions, not only we show that the steady state is unique, but also we clarify
its stability properties through a local analysis. We ﬁnd that, in many cases,
the introduction of elastic labor supply promotes convergence by widening the
range of parameters for saddle-path stability, and endogenous cycles can even-
tually disappear. These results are robustly illustrated by means of canonical
examples in which consumers have separable, KPR or homogeneous preferences.
Keywords: Saddle-path stability, endogenous cycles, heterogeneous agents, en-
dogenous labor supply, borrowing constraint.
Résumé
Dans ce papier, nous nous intéressons à la question des cycles déterministes
dans le modèle de Ramsey avec agents hétérogènes et contrainte d'emprunt,
étendu au cas où l'oﬀre de travail est élastique. Sous des restrictions habituelles,
non seulement nous montrons que l'état stationnaire est unique, mais analysons
aussi ses propriétés de stabilité à travers une analyse locale. Nous trouvons que,
dans la plupart des cas, l'introduction d'une oﬀre de travail élastique favorise
la convergence, et les cycles endogènes peuvent même disparaître. Ces résultats
sont illustrés de manière robuste dans trois exemples dans lesquels les préférences
des consommateurs sont séparables, de type KPR, et homogènes.
Mots-clés: Stabilité de point-selle, cycles endogènes, agents hétérogènes, oﬀre
de travail endogène, contrainte d'emprunt.
JEL classiﬁcation: C62, D30, E32.
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1 Introduction
Growth theorists are usually confronted with the question of convergence of an
economic system. In neoclassical model of capital accumulation, commonly ad-
dressed questions are whether economies converge to the same long-run equilib-
rium, how convergence takes place and whether is monotonic, how fundamentals
aﬀect the stability properties of equilibrium.2
The most inﬂuential growth model is undoubtedly Ramsey which is char-
acterized, in its basic version, by a representative agent with exogenous labor
supply, saddle-path stability, equilibrium uniqueness and optimality. In order
to add a degree of realism, economic literature has not only introduced vari-
ous kinds of market imperfections, but also considered elastic labor supply and
agents' heterogeneity.
On the one side, a class of papers have been devoted in the last decade to
shed a light on the interplay between the consumption-labor arbitrage and the
mechanism of capital accumulation in models with a representative consumer.
The reader is referred, among others, to De Hek (1998), a one-sector model
with an inﬁnite-lived agent; to Bosi, Magris and Venditti (2005), a two-sector
model; to Ladron-de-Guevara, Ortiguiera and Santos (1997), an endogenous
growth model; to Nourry (2001) and Nourry and Venditti (2006), overlapping
generations economies; to, eventually, Pintus (2006) and Garnier, Nishimura
and Venditti (2006), models with externalities.
On the other side, there are papers with heterogeneous consumers which
focus on the convergence of capital accumulation and distribution in the long
run. Unlike the case with a representative agent, consumers' heterogeneity
promotes borrowing transactions. The existence of borrowing constraints plays
a key role on the dynamics of capital accumulation. Becker (1980), Becker and
Foias (1987, 1994) and Sorger (1994) study economies where agents discount
future diﬀerently, while Hernandez (1991) consider heterogenous but equally
patient consumers.
Surprisingly, few works have investigated the role of elastic labor supply
on equilibrium transition and the long run when consumers are heterogeneous.
In this respect, most papers focus on heterogeneity in wealth (Sorger (2000),
Ghiglino and Sorger (2002), Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006)).
In this paper, we are interested in the eﬀects of endogenous labor supply
on the saddle-path stability when consumers' heterogeneity concerns not only
their endowments but also their preferences. In this connection, we consider
inﬁnite-lived consumers with preferences which are additively separable over
time, but depend on consumption and leisure at each period. Heterogeneity is
now threefold and turns on capital wealth, time preference and intra-temporal
preferences. In addition, in line with Becker (1980), Becker and Foias (1987,
1994), Hernandez (1991) and Sorger (1994), we assume that consumers cannot
borrow against their future labor income. This borrowing constraint implicitly
2Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) provide an introductory but representative survey of the
literature.
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means that, in contrast to Le Van, Manh Hung and Vailakis (2006), markets
are incomplete.
Under these assumptions, we show that, as in Becker (1980), Becker and
Foias (1987, 1994), and Sorger (1994), the most patient household owns the
whole capital stock in a neighborhood of the steady state, whereas the others
consume their per-period labor income. In the rest of the paper, since we
are mainly interested in local dynamics around the steady state, we can focus
directly on such equilibria with extreme distribution of capital.
Under usual hypotheses, we prove the existence of a unique steady state
in contrast with Sorger (2000) who obtains a continuum of long-run equilibria.
Sorger's assumption of a common discount factor across the agents prevents a
long-run concentration of wealth in the hands of the most patient individual.
Survival of many capital owners in the long run entails also a sensitivity of the
steady state to disaggregate initial conditions, namely the initial distribution of
wealth, accounting for a continuum of stationary equilibria.
When there are no impatient agents in the economy, our model gets closer to
De Hek (1998) with a representative agent. However, normality assumptions on
consumption and leisure prevents us to obtain multiple steady states in contrast
with him, who obtains multiplicity under very unusual conditions.
In order to study the convergence to the (unique) steady state, while under-
lining the role of heterogeneous preferences and elastic labor supply, we focus on
their eﬀects on the saddle-path stability and the occurrence of a ﬂip bifurcation.
In economies with inelastic labor supply (Becker and Foias (1994)), the occur-
rence of endogenous cycles requires suﬃciently weak capital-labor substitution.
Introducing leisure in the utility functions, we ﬁnd that the impatient agent's
preferences play a role on the stability properties of the steady state.
We derive conditions for saddle-path stability and the occurrence of two-
period cycles under very general preferences in consumption and leisure. Then,
in order to provide a more explicit characterization and to check the robustness
of saddle-path stability, we focus on four particular cases.
First, the representative agent's case is nested in the general model and de-
serves some comparative comment with the existing literature. Second, hetero-
geneous preferences are considered, but separable in consumption and leisure,
in order to simplify and clarify conditions for cycles. Third, a KPR3 speci-
ﬁcation is taken into account to prove that an elastic labor supply promotes
stability. Eventually, the case of homogeneous preferences conﬁrms how robust
saddle-path stability is.
In the ﬁrst case (representative (patient) agent), we gets closer to De Hek
(1998). Under very usual restrictions, such as normality, we ﬁnd a unique capital
path, which prevents the economy from deterministic ﬂuctuations and, shortly,
we stress his lack of robustness.
In the other cases, heterogeneity is restored. When preferences are separa-
ble in consumption and leisure, the impatient agents' intertemporal substitution
in consumption matters. More precisely, when their elasticity of intertemporal
3See King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
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substitution becomes greater than one, the introduction of elastic labor supplies
promotes stability by making conditions for cycles more demanding in terms of
technological parameters. However, the opposite conclusion holds when elastic-
ity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is less than one.
The class KPR of utility functions is used in growth literature to lighten
restrictions on intra-temporal preferences in order to get positive growth rates.
In this case, the patient agent's preferences matter, while the impatient agents'
ones play no role on dynamics. More precisely, convergence to the steady state
requires an elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption not too weak
and a leisure utility not too concave, whatever the elasticity of capital-labor
substitution.
Finally, when preferences are homogeneous, the patient agent's degree of
homogeneity becomes a key parameter. We prove that when it is suﬃciently
close to one (including the CES and the Cobb-Douglas cases), we recover the
saddle-path stability, whatever shape the other fundamentals have.
To understand why preferences play a role on stability properties, we mind
that, when labor supply is inelastic, instability ensues from a negative response
of the patient agent's income to a rise in the capital stock. When labor supplies
become elastic, they also aﬀect his income. In addition, the endogenous labor
supplies vary because an increase in the capital stock raises the real wage. Since
preferences underlie and determine the elasticities of labor supply with respect
to the real wage, unsurprisingly they have a great inﬂuence on dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The general model with het-
erogeneous consumers, elastic labor and borrowing constraints is presented in
Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to compute a two-dimensional system represent-
ing the equilibrium dynamics. Existence and uniqueness of the steady state are
proved in Section 4. Section 5 focuses on the stability properties and the occur-
rence of bifurcations under unspeciﬁed preferences. Sections 6 characterizes an
economy with representative consumer. Sections 7 to 9 revisit the general ﬁnd-
ings in the case of separable, KPR or homogeneous preferences, respectively. In
Section 10, we provide an economic interpretation of the results, keeping in mind
the stability issue. Section 11 concludes, while technical details are gathered in
the Appendix.
2 A growth model with heterogeneous households
We address the saddle-path stability issue in a discrete time growth model with
heterogeneous agents and borrowing constraints. Consumers are diﬀerently en-
dowed with capital and have diﬀerent preferences. In this respect, we assume a
twofold kind of heterogeneity in tastes: on the one hand, heterogeneous discount
factors; on the other hand, diﬀerent instantaneous utilities in consumption and
leisure across the households.
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2.1 Consumers
There is a ﬁnite number (1 + n) of heterogeneous inﬁnite lived agents, who are
identiﬁed by a progressive label i = 0, 1, . . . , n according to their time preference,
that is, to the (decreasing) ranking of their discount factors:
0 ≤ βn ≤ . . . ≤ β1 < β0 < 1 (1)
We notice that a degree of heterogeneity between the more patient agent
(i = 0) and the others is required at least.
At each period, the consumer i is endowed with one unit of time that he
shares between labor and leisure. We denote his consumption and labor supply
at period t with cit and lit. Preferences are represented by an utility function
in consumption and leisure which is separable over time:
∞∑
t=0
βtiui (cit, 1− lit) (2)
Consumer i maximizes (2) under a sequence of budget constraints:
cit + kit+1 −∆kit ≤ rtkit + wtlit (3)
and a sequence of borrowing constraints:
kit ≥ 0 (4)
Notation is quite usual: r and w denote the interest rate and the wage,
respectively, while ∆ ≡ 1 − δ with δ ∈ (0, 1) the depreciation rate of capital.
The initial (heterogeneous) endowments ki0 ≥ 0 are given, with at least one
strictly positive.
Assumption 1 The utility function ui (ci, 1− li) is deﬁned on [0,+∞) ×
[0, 1] for every i = 0, . . . , n; it is C2 on (0,+∞) × (0, 1), increasing in each
argument and concave:4
ui11 < 0 < ui1 (5)
ui22 < 0 < ui2 (6)
ui12ui21 ≤ ui11ui22 (7)
and satisﬁes the boundary conditions limci→0 ui1 (ci, 1− li) /ui2 (ci, 1− li) =
+∞, limli→1 ui1 (ci, 1− li) /ui2 (ci, 1− li) = 0 on (0,+∞)× (0, 1).
We also introduce a kind of normality between consumption and leisure.
Assumption 2
ui11/ui1 < ui21/ui2 and ui22/ui2 < ui12/ui1 (8)
4In the following, we set uij ≡ ∂ui (x1, x2) /∂xj for j = 1, 2 and uijk ≡ ∂uij (x1, x2) /∂xk
for k = 1, 2.
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We observe that a more usual deﬁnition of normality is entailed by inequal-
ities (8) jointly with the consumption-leisure arbitrage (ui2 = wui1) as equilib-
rium condition in Proposition 1 below.
As intuition suggests and economic literature conﬁrms,5 the patient agents
will hold the whole stock of capital near the steady state. In order to characterize
the equilibrium with high concentration of capital, we need a formal statement.
Proposition 1 Near a steady state, the impatient agents (i = 1, . . . , n) end up
with no capital (kit = 0), while the patient one (i = 0) ends up to hold the entire
amount of capital (k0t > 0).
On the one hand, a consumption-leisure arbitrage condition holds for every
agent including the patient one (i = 0, 1, . . . , n):
ui2 (cit, 1− lit) = ui1 (cit, 1− lit)wt (9)
On the other hand, the patient capitalist (i = 0) and the impatient agents
(i ≥ 1) have diﬀerent sequences of budget constraints:
c0t + k0t+1 = Rtk0t + wtl0t (10)
cit = wtlit, for i = 1, . . . , n (11)
and smooth consumption diﬀerently over time: the capitalist according to a Euler
equation:
u01 (c0t, 1− l0t)
u01 (c0t+1, 1− l0t+1) = β0Rt+1 (12)
whereas the impatient consumers according to the following inequality:
ui1 (wtlit, 1− lit)
ui1 (wt+1lit+1, 1− lit+1) > βiRt+1 (13)
Individual transversality conditions are also satisﬁed.6
Proof. See the Appendix.
As equation (12) suggests, the patient consumer's discount factor plays a
great role in determining capital accumulation. To lighten notation, we will set
from now on β ≡ β0 and refer equivalently to the more patient agent as the
capitalist.
For the sake of conciseness, we introduce also the elasticities of marginal
utility through which slope and concavity of the utility functions will be char-
acterized: [
εi11 εi12
εi21 εi22
]
≡
[
ui11ci
ui1
ui12(1−li)
ui1
ui21ci
ui2
ui22(1−li)
ui2
]
(15)
5Among others, the reader is referred to the seminal work of Becker (1980).
6Since kit+1 → 0 for every i ≥ 1, what actually matters is the capitalist's transversality
condition:
lim
t→+∞β
tu01 (c0t, 1− l0t) kt+1 = 0 (14)
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We notice that the concavity restrictions (5) and (6) (on the left-hand-side)
and (7) now become:
εi11 < 0, εi22 < 0 and εi11εi22 ≥ εi12εi21 (16)
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, respectively. Normality inequalities (8) (Assumption 2) also
simplify:
εi11 < εi21 and εi22 < εi12 (17)
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n.
2.2 Firms
We denote the aggregate capital and labor with kt and lt, respectively. The
representative ﬁrm produces the ﬁnal good yt = F (kt, lt) ≡ f (at) lt with a
constant returns to scale technology and a degree of capital intensity at ≡ kt/lt,
in order to maximize the proﬁt pit ≡ yt − rtkt − wtlt at every period t. The
intensive production function f satisﬁes standard neoclassical requirements.
Assumption 3 The intensive production f (a) is a continuous function of
the capital-labor ratio a ≥ 0, positive-valued and diﬀerentiable, as many times as
needed, for a > 0, with f ′′ (a) < 0 < f ′ (a) and f(0) = 0, lima→0 f ′ (a) = +∞,
lima→+∞ f ′ (a) = 0.
Firms' proﬁt maximizing behavior entails that production takes place in
period t so that the capital-labor ratio at equates the real rental rate of capital
services rt with the marginal productivity of capital and the real wage wt with
the marginal productivity of labor.
rt = f ′ (at) ≡ r (at) (18)
wt = f (at)− f ′ (at) at ≡ w (at) (19)
It is not unworthy to highlight the underlying relations existing between
the elasticities of the interest rate with respect to capital and labor rkk/r,
rll/r, the analogous elasticities of the real wage wkk/w, wll/w, the capital
share in total income s (a) ≡ f ′ (a) a/f (a) ∈ (0, 1) and the elasticity of capital-
labor substitution: σ (a) ≡ [af ′ (a) /f (a)− 1] f ′ (a) / [af ′′ (a)] > 0. Standard
computations give krk/r = −lrl/r = − [1− s(a)] /σ(a) and kwk/w = −lwl/w =
s(a)/σ(a).
2.3 Equilibrium
An intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence of prices (or, dually, of quantities)
that clears the markets in every period. Equilibria in good and labor markets
require:
ct + kt+1 −∆kt = F (kt, lt) and lt =
n∑
i=0
lit, (20)
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where ct ≡
∑n
i=0 cit denotes the aggregate consumption, for t = 0, 1, . . . ,+∞.
We observe that equation (20) is immediately obtained by aggregating budget
constraints (10) and (11) across the individuals. Since the patient agent ends
up to hold all the capital stock, we have also the following condition:
kt = k0t (21)
In order to ﬁnd the equilibrium path prevailing around the steady state
and characterized by a concentration of capital in the hands of a single agent
(equation (21)), we derive the dynamic system and study the local dynamics
around its stationary solution.
3 Dynamic system
Equation (9) is informative about the slope of the patient agent's labor supply
l0. We keep (9) with i = 0 and we solve (locally) for l0:
l0t = l0 (wt, c0t) (22)
Substituting (11) in (9), we transform the consumption-arbitrage condition
of the ith impatient agent in an implicit equation relating his labor supply to
the real wage:
ui2 (wtlit, 1− lit) = ui1 (wtlit, 1− lit)wt (23)
or, locally,
lit = l∗i (wt) (24)
We observe that the labor supply of an impatient agent just depends on the
real wage, while the patient agent's labor supply depends also on his consump-
tion demand. To ensure that labor supplies are correctly deﬁned as functions,
we use the assumptions made above on the shapes of utility and production
functions.
Lemma 2 If liml0t→0 u02 (c0t, 1− l0t) /u01 (c0t, 1− l0t) < wt and Assumptions
1-3 are satisﬁed, the functions lit = l∗i (wt) and l0t = l0 (c0t, wt) are well deﬁned.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since the purpose of the section is deriving a dynamic system, we need to
reduce the number of variables, aggregating, for instance, the labor supplies. In
this respect, putting together equations (19), (20), (22) and (24), we obtain:
lt = l0 (w (kt/lt) , c0t) +
n∑
i=1
l∗i (w (kt/lt)) (25)
that is an implicit equation relating the aggregate labor supply l to the aggregate
capital k and the individual consumption c0. More explicitly, but locally under
the usual hypotheses of the implicit function theorem, we get:
lt ≡ l (kt, c0t) (26)
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At the very core of dynamics is the capitalist's behavior: Replacing expres-
sions (18), (19), (22) and (26) in his budget constraint (10) and in his Euler
equation (12), eventually, we obtain the equilibrium dynamics:
u01 (c0t, 1− l0 (w (kt/l (kt, c0t)) , c0t))
u01 (c0t+1, 1− l0 (w (kt+1/l (kt+1, c0t+1)) , c0t+1)) = β
[
∆+ r
(
kt+1
l (kt+1, c0t+1)
)]
(27)
c0t + kt+1 −∆kt = r
(
kt
l (kt, c0t)
)
kt + w
(
kt
l (kt, c0t)
)
l0
(
w
(
kt
l (kt, c0t)
)
, c0t
)
(28)
where the initial condition k0 > 0 is given7 and the transversality condition (14)
holds.
Dynamic system (27)-(28) deserves some comments. It holds at every period,
t = 0, 1, . . . ,+∞, and deﬁnes an intertemporal sequence (c0t, kt)t≥0. Usually,
the dynamic system of the Ramsey model is written in the representative agent's
pair of variables (k, c). The capital stock k is a predetermined state variable,
while the consumption expenditure c jumps in order to make the equilibrium
path positive and compatible with the transversality condition. In our model,
the aggregate capital remains predetermined, but the aggregate consumption is
replaced by the disaggregate capitalist's consumption.8
In the following, ﬁrst, the uniqueness of the steady state will be stated; then,
saddle-path stability and the existence of ﬂip and period-doubling bifurcations
will be characterized through the analysis of a linear approximation of system
(27)-(28) around the steady state.
4 Steady state
A stationary state of dynamic system (27)-(28) is a solution (k, c0) = (kt, c0t)
of the following system for all t = 0, 1, . . . ,+∞:
1
β
−∆ = r
(
k
l (k, c0)
)
(29)
c0 =
1− β
β
k + w
(
k
l (k, c0)
)
l0
(
w
(
k
l (k, c0)
)
, c0
)
where the functions l0 (w, c0) and l (k, c0) are now deﬁned at the steady state
by (22) and (26), respectively. In the next proposition, we analyze the existence
and the uniqueness of such stationary solution:
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-3, there exists a unique steady state.
7The initial aggregate capital stock is deﬁned by k0 =
∑n
i=0 ki0. The equilibria considered
in this section implicitly requires an initial distribution of capital close enough to that of
Proposition 1.
8Writing an equivalent system in the pair of variables (k, c), where c is the aggregate
consumption, or in the pair (k, l), will complicate needlessly the size of equations under study,
whereas the associated eigenvalues are invariant to the choice of variables.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
In contrast to Sorger (2000), there is no room for a continuum of stationary
solutions parametrized by the initial distribution of wealth. In Sorger's paper,
agents have heterogeneous initial capital endowments, but share the same pref-
erences and in particular the same discount factor. Since in our case the more
patient agent ends up to hold the whole capital stock, the stationary distribution
of wealth is determined by his heterogeneous discount factor and the existence
of borrowing constraints, and does not meet Sorger's conditions for multiplicity.
Eventually, we notice that, setting n = 0 and lt = l0 (wt, c0t), we get the
optimal growth model with representative consumer as particular case. In this
respect, Proposition 3 still applies. Our conventional assumptions entail results
which appear in open contrast with those obtained by De Hek (1998) who
analyzes an aggregate optimal growth model with leisure-depending preferences.
In order to reconcile the papers, we simply observe that his multiplicity of steady
states rest on some unusual assumptions, namely the lack of normality between
consumption and leisure.9
5 On the saddle-path stability
Convergence to the steady state is the core of the paper. This issue is ad-
dressed through a local analysis, i.e., through the analysis of a neighborhood of
the steady state, where the intertemporal equilibrium deﬁned in Proposition 1
precisely holds.
In order to characterize the stability properties of the steady state and the
occurrence of local bifurcations, we proceed by linearizing the dynamic system
(27)-(28) around the steady state (k, c0) and computing the Jacobian matrix
J , evaluated at this steady state. Local dynamics are represented by a linear
system (dkt+1/k, dc0t+1/c0)T = J (dkt/k, dc0t/c0)T . In the following, we exploit
the fact that the trace T and the determinantD of J are the sum and the product
of the eigenvalues, respectively. As emphasized by Grandmont, Pintus and de
Vilder (1998), the stability properties of the system, that is, the location of the
eigenvalues with respect to the unit circle, can be better characterized in the
(T,D)-plane (see Figures 1-3).
In concrete terms, we evaluate the characteristic polynomial P (α) ≡ α2 −
Tα + D at −1, 0, 1. Along the line (AC), one eigenvalue is equal to 1, i.e.,
P (1) = 1 − T + D = 0. Along the line (AB), one eigenvalue is equal to −1,
i.e., P (−1) = 1 + T + D = 0. On the segment [BC], the two eigenvalues are
complex and conjugate with unit modulus, i.e., D = 1 and |T | < 2. Therefore,
inside the triangle ABC, the steady state is a sink, i.e., locally indeterminate
(D < 1 and |T | < 1 +D). It is a saddle point if (T,D) lies on the right sides
of both (AB) and (AC) or on the left sides of both of them (|1 +D| < |T |).
It is a source otherwise. A (local) bifurcation arises when an eigenvalue crosses
9In Section 6, the unconventional equilibrium transitions found by De Hek (1998) are
questioned on the same basis.
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the unit circle, that is, when the pair (T,D) crosses one of the loci (AB),
(AC) or [BC]. (T,D) depends on the structural parameters. We choose a
parameter of interest and we study how (T,D) moves with it in the (T,D)-
plane. More explicitly, according to the changes in the bifurcation parameter,
a transcritical bifurcation (generically) occurs when (T,D) goes through (AC),
a ﬂip bifurcation (generically) arises when (T,D) crosses (AB), whereas a Hopf
bifurcation (generically) emerges when (T,D) goes through the segment [BC].
The expressions of T and D involve the elasticities of labor supply, which
are a central link in the chain of eﬀects accounting for the degree of stabil-
ity. From (22) and (24), one deﬁnes these elasticities as ξ0 ≡ (∂l0/∂w) (w/l0)
for the capitalist, ξi ≡ l∗′i (w)w/li for the impatient agents. The average elas-
ticity of labor supply ξ ≡ ∑ni=0 λiξi is naturally deﬁned, by weighting the
individual elasticities with the individual labor shares in total labor supply
λi ≡ li/l, i = 0, 1, . . . , n.10 Another average elasticity of labor supply of in-
terest is ξ˜ ≡ ∑ni=1 λiξi/ (1− λ0), which takes in account only the impatient
agents' elasticities ξi's and summarizes the role of their preferences on the dy-
namics. Clearly, ξ = λ0ξ0 + (1− λ0) ξ˜. We also denote the elasticity of capital-
labor substitution with σ and the capital share in total income evaluated at
the steady state with s. Eventually, we need to introduce a reduced parameter
ρ ≡ βr (1− s) /s = (1− β∆) (1− s) /s, before presenting the determinant and
the trace:11
D (σ) =
1
β
− ρ
β
1
ξ˜ − ξ˜∗ + σs 11−λ0
(30)
T (σ) = 1 +
1
β
− ρ
β
1
ξ˜ − ξ˜∗ + σs 11−λ0
1
S
(31)
where
ξ˜
∗ ≡ 1− l0
l − l0
ε011 + ρ (ε011 − ε021)
ε011ε022 − ε012ε021 < 0 (32)
S ≡
[
1− (1− β + ρ) (ε021 − ε011) (1− l0) + (1− β + ρλ0) (ε012 − ε022) l
(ε011ε022 − ε012ε021) (l − l0)
]−1
(33)
In order to apply the geometrical method introduced by Grandmont, Pintus
and de Vilder (1998), we need to choose carefully the parameter with respect
to which the bifurcation analysis is leaded. An ideal choice is a signiﬁcant pa-
rameters from an economic point of view, which has, in addition, a linear image
in the (T,D)-plane: a half-line is unambiguously determined by the origin and
the slope. Fortunately, the elasticity of capital-labor substitution σ meets both
the criteria:12 The locus Σ ≡ {(T (σ) , D (σ)) : σ ≥ 0} is either a (connected)
10Notice also that ∑ni=0 λi = 1.11The detailed computations of J , T and D are relegated in the Appendix.
12In a Ramsey model with heterogeneous consumers and borrowing constraints, but in-
elastic labor supplies, Becker and Foias (1994) choose the same parameter to make the (ﬂip)
bifurcation analysis, while following a diﬀerent (non-geometrical) approach.
12
segment or an (unconnected) half-line in the (T,D)-plane (see Figures 1-3) with
an origin (σ = 0):
D (0) =
1
β
− ρ
β
1
ξ˜ − ξ˜∗
(34)
T (0) = 1 +
1
β
− ρ
β
1
ξ˜ − ξ˜∗
1
S
(35)
an endpoint (σ = +∞):
(T (+∞) , D (+∞)) = (1 + 1/β, 1/β) (36)
and a slope D′ (σ) /T ′ (σ) = S. From (33), we note that S /∈ [0, 1]. Moreover,
the endpoint (T1(+∞), D1(+∞)) is on the line (AC), above the point C.
-
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Figure 1: S > 1
The locus Σ is either a segment or a half-line. Even if the line including
Σ always crosses the line (AB),13 the intersection of (AB) with Σ could be
13The case S = −1 is generically omitted.
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Figure 2: S < −1
empty. In order to characterize the shape of Σ and provide clear-cut bifurcation
conditions, we need to detail the properties of trace and determinant as functions
of σ.
Since D′ (σ) > 0, when σ increases from 0 to +∞, the point (T (σ) , D (σ))
moves always upward along Σ from the origin (T (0) , D (0)), to the endpoint
(T (+∞) , D (+∞)). If Σ crosses the line (AB), then a ﬂip bifurcation generically
occurs for a positive value of σ, say σF , corresponding to the intersection and
solving the equation D (σ) = −T (σ)− 1.
A quick look to the (T,D)-plane will convince the reader that few infor-
mations are required to locate Σ and determine the stability properties of the
steady state.
(1) Is the origin (T (0) , D (0)) above or below the endpoint (1 + 1/β, 1/β)?
(2) Is the origin (T (0) , D (0)) above or below the ﬂip line (AB)?
(3) Is the slope steeper (|S| > 1) or ﬂatter (−1 < S < 0)?
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Figure 3: −1 < S < 0
We ﬁrst ﬁnd explicit conditions for points (1) and (2).
(1) The necessary and suﬃcient condition for the origin to stay above the
endpoint is D (0) > 1/β, that is
ξ˜ < ξ˜
∗
(37)
In this case, Σ is a half-line starting from D = D (0) > 1/β, going up to
D = +∞ and jumping to D = −∞ for σ = σ∞, and going up to D = 1/β, with
σ∞ ≡ s (1− λ0)
(
ξ˜
∗ − ξ˜
)
.
(2) The necessary and suﬃcient condition for the origin (T (0) , D (0)) to lie
above the line (AB) is D (0) > −T (0)− 1 or, equivalently,
κ/
(
ξ˜ − ξ˜∗
)
< 1 (38)
where
κ ≡ ρ (1 + S) / [2 (1 + β)S] (39)
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Using these two results, we discuss now the stability properties of the steady
state and the occurrence of bifurcations considering two cases for the slope.
(3) We assume |S| > 1 and −1 < S < 0 in order.
(3.1) |S| > 1: κ is positive and three subcases matter (see Figures 1 and 2):
(3.1.1) If ξ˜ < ξ˜
∗
, inequalities (37) and (38) are satisﬁed. (T (0), D(0))
is above the endpoint (T (+∞) , D (+∞)) and the line (AB). Σ is a
jumping half-line that crosses the line (AB) at σ = σF . Therefore,
the steady state is a source for 0 < σ < σF and a saddle for σ > σF .
(3.1.2) If ξ˜
∗
< ξ˜ < ξ˜
∗
+ κ, inequalities (37) and (38) are no longer
satisﬁed. The origin is below the endpoint and the line (AB). Σ is a
segment that crosses the line (AB). Therefore, the steady state is a
source for 0 < σ < σF and a saddle for σ > σF .
(3.1.3) If ξ˜
∗
+ κ < ξ˜, inequality (37) is not satisﬁed, while (38) is. The
origin is below the endpoint and above the line (AB). Σ is a segment
that does not cross the line (AB), which means that the steady state
is a saddle whatever σ.
(3.2) −1 < S < 0: κ is negative and three subcases matter (see Figure 3):
(3.2.1) If ξ˜ < ξ˜
∗
+ κ, inequalities (37) and (38) are satisﬁed. The origin
is above the endpoint and the line (AB). Σ is a jumping half-line
that crosses the line (AB). Therefore, the steady state is a source for
0 < σ < σF and a saddle for σ > σF .
(3.2.2) If ξ˜
∗
+κ < ξ˜ < ξ˜
∗
, inequality (37) is satisﬁed, while (38) no longer
holds. The origin is above the endpoint, but below the line (AB). Σ
is a jumping half-line that does not cross the line (AB). The steady
state is a saddle whatever σ.
(3.2.3) If ξ˜
∗
< ξ˜, inequality (37) is no longer satisﬁed, while (38) is. The
origin is below the endpoint and above the line (AB). Σ is a segment
that does not cross the line (AB). As in the previous subcase, the
steady state is a saddle for all σ.
Summing up, we notice that, when ξ˜ < ξ˜
∗
+ κ, the steady state is a source
for 0 < σ < σF and a saddle for σ > σF , and the system undergoes a ﬂip
bifurcation at σ = σF (subcases (3.1.1), (3.1.2), (3.2.1)). In contrast, when
ξ˜
∗
+ κ < ξ˜, we get a saddle, whatever σ (subcases (3.1.3), (3.2.2), (3.2.3)).
All these necessary and suﬃcient conditions are summarized in the next
proposition.
Proposition 4 Let
σF ≡ s (1− λ0)
(
ξ˜
∗
+ κ − ξ˜
)
(40)
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where ξ˜
∗
and κ are given by (32) and (39), respectively. The following results
generically hold.
If the impatient agents' average elasticity of labor supply is greater than a
threshold, that is, ξ˜ ≥ ξ˜∗ + κ, the steady state is a saddle, whatever the degree
of capital-labor substitution σ > 0.
If the impatient agents' average elasticity of labor supply is smaller than a
threshold, that is, ξ˜ < ξ˜
∗
+κ, the steady state is a source when inputs are rather
complementary (0 < σ < σF ) and it is a saddle when they are rather substi-
tutable (σ > σF ). When σ crosses σF , the system undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation.
This proposition states that the steady state is always locally determinate.
However, saddle-path stability and local convergence is not always ensured.
When the substitution between capital and labor is suﬃciently weak, the steady
state can loose stability through the occurrence of a cycle of period two.
Proposition 4 is as general as somewhat cryptic. In order to make the role of
preferences on (in)stability more explicit and provide an economic interpretation
of bifurcation, we have to go beyond the generality of proposition and specify
the fundamentals. Four canonical cases are retained.
At the ﬁrst stage, we recover the particular case of a representative agent in
order to compare our results with De Hek (1998).
At the second stage, we come back to heterogeneous consumers and we ana-
lyze three classes of preferences commonly employed in economic literature: sep-
arable, KPR14 and homogeneous utility functions in consumption and leisure.
6 Representative agent
In order to compare our model to the benchmark, we reduce the number of
agents to one, the patient agent. In this case, we are also able to criticize De Hek
(1998), who characterize transitional dynamics with representative consumer
and elastic labor supply under somewhat unconventional assumptions.
Setting n = 0, we reduce agents' heterogeneity to the patient agent, now
representative. Formally, let λ0 = 1: the average elasticity of labor supply
becomes ξ = ξ0, while the locus Σ becomes a horizontal segment deﬁned by:
Σ = {(T,D) : D = 1/β, T (+∞) ≤ T ≤ T (0)} (41)
where still T (+∞) = 1 + 1/β, but now
T (0) = 1 +
1
β
+
ρ (1− β + ρ)
β
ε021 − ε011 + (ε012 − ε022) l0/ (1− l0)
ρ (ε021 − ε011)− ε011
Σ lies entirely on the right-hand side of the endpoint (1/β, 1 + 1/β) in the
region of the saddle points. Indeed, it is enough to observe that the slope S
is zero (expression (33)), that T ′ (σ) < 0 (expression (31)) and that T (0) >
14Popularized by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), these preferences allow a positive growth
rate in endogenous growth models.
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T (+∞) = 1 + 1/β, under the standard concavity and normality assumptions
(16) and (17).
Let us summarize these ﬁndings as follows.
Corollary 5 Without heterogeneity, the steady state is always a saddle and the
convergence to the steady state is monotonic.
In contrast to De Hek (1998), we have proved that neither non-monotonic
trajectories nor endogenous cycles occur in a one-sector optimal growth model
with leisure in the utility function. The key assumption is that of normality
(inequalities (17) entailing T (0) > T (+∞)). As a matter of fact, De Hek
not only introduces a production function which depends on past labor supply
and is open to criticism; but also, more questionably, does not impose that
consumption and leisure are normal goods at a macroeconomic level.
In the following, we come back to the model with heterogeneous agents and
borrowing constraints. As seen above, to understand the role of preferences on
saddle-path stability, we specify three classes of utility functions, widely used in
economic models: the separable, the KPR and the homogeneous preferences.
7 Separable utilities
Assume the utility functions of all consumers to be separable in consumption and
leisure, i.e., take the form ui (cit, 1− lit) ≡ vi (cit) + wi (1− lit), with v′i (ci) >
0, w′i (1− li) > 0, v′′i (ci) ≤ 0, w′′i (1− li) ≤ 0. Still applying the results of
Proposition 4, we will able to capture the role of concavity in consumption and
leisure on convergence.
Separability and concavity of the utility functions of all consumers i =
0, 1, ..., n entail εi12 = εi21 = 0 and εi11 < 0, εi22 < 0, respectively. Then,
the critical values for the impatient agents' average elasticity of labor supply
and the elasticity of capital-labor substitution, involved in Proposition 4, sim-
plify:
ξ˜
∗ ≡ − 1 + ρ
1− λ0λ0ξ0 (42)
ξ˜
∗
+ κ =
1
1− λ0
[
σI
s
− λ0ξ0
(
1 +
ρ
2
3 + β + ρ
1 + β
)]
σF ≡ σI − s
[
(1− λ0) ξ˜ + λ0ξ0
(
1 +
ρ
2
3 + β + ρ
1 + β
)]
(43)
where ξ0 = − (1− l0) / (l0ε022) is now the capitalist's (partial) elasticity of labor
supply and:
σI ≡ sρ1 + β
(
1− λ0 + 1− β + ρλ02ε011
)
(44)
It is not unworthy to focus on the limit case with inelastic labor supply,
already investigated by Becker and Foias (1987, 1994), in order to make ideas
clearer about the role of endogenous labor supplies on the stability properties.
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7.1 Inelastic labor supply
When agents supply labor inelastically, the leisure elasticity εi22 falls to −∞
and, according to formulas (42), (70) and (72), ξi = ξ˜ = ξ˜
∗
= 0 for every
i ≥ 0. By Proposition 4, the occurrence of a ﬂip bifurcation needs ξ˜ < ξ˜∗ + κ,
that is, now, a positive critical elasticity σF = σI . In the light of equation
(44), the patient consumer is required to have a suﬃciently weak intertemporal
substitution in consumption, i.e., −1/ε011 < 2 (1− λ0) / (1− β + ρλ0).
According to expression (44), the bifurcation value σI decreases in the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption −1/ε011 > 0. Since σI <
sρ/ (1 + β) and ρ = (1− β∆) (1− s) /s, we get σI < 1 − s. Consequently,
in a model with inelastic labor supply, the existence of cycles and instability
requires the capital income (rk) to decrease when capital increases. A weak
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption −1/ε011 > 0 prevents
the intertemporal arbitrage (see Becker and Foias (1987, 1994)).
We further notice that, in contrast to the case with endogenous labor supply,
the preferences of impatient consumers play no role on the stability properties
of the steady state and the occurrence of cycles.
7.2 Elastic labor supply
The opposite case with elastic labor supply is now considered. Without a sig-
niﬁcant loss of generality, we assume that all the impatient agents (i = 1, . . . , n)
share the same instantaneous utility function and, in consequence, the same
labor supply li ≡ m as well as the same elasticities εi11 ≡ ε11, εi22 ≡ ε22. Ac-
cording to (72) (see the Appendix), their individual (and average) elasticity of
labor supply becomes:
ξ˜ = − 1 + ε11
ε11 + ε22m/ (1−m) (45)
while the capitalist's elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage is
deﬁned as above by ξ0 = − (1− l0) / (l0ε022) > 0. In the following, we consider
two polar cases.
Assume ﬁrst that the impatient agents' consumption is suﬃciently substi-
tutable over time (−1/ε11 > 1). Hence, labor supply turns out to be positive-
sloped for all the agents. We notice that the more elastic the labor supplies
(higher ξ0 and ξ˜),15 the weaker the bifurcation elasticity of capital-labor substi-
tution σF (see (43)).16 This means that the range of parameter compatible with
the saddle-path stability (σF ,+∞) widens with the elasticity of labor supply
and restrictions for instability and cycles become more demanding than under
an exogenous labor supply.
If the impatient agents' intertemporal substitution in consumption is suﬃ-
ciently weak (−1/ε11 < 1), then, according to (45), ξ˜ becomes negative (while
15Notice that the less concave the disutilities of labor, the more elastic the labor supplies.
16In any case, σF < σI because the term into brackets on the RHS of (43) is negative.
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ξ0 still remains positive) and the critical elasticity σF can be greater than σI .
By direct inspection of equation (43), this requires:
ξ˜ < − λ0ξ0
1− λ0
(
1 +
ρ
2
3 + β + ρ
1 + β
)
We deduce that σF > σI if the patient agent's labor supply is not too elastic
and the negative aggregate elasticity ξ˜ not too close to zero, that is, the impa-
tient agents' elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (−1/ε11)
remains suﬃciently weak. In this case, the introduction of a consumption-leisure
arbitrage promotes instability and cycles, because the range of parameters for
saddle-path stability (σF ,+∞) shrinks and the ﬂip bifurcation occurs under a
higher substitutability between capital and labor.
Now, let us provide two examples based on non-separable utility functions.
Two popular speciﬁcations in macrodynamic literature are retained.
8 KPR preferences
In this section, we consider preferences à la King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
They have the advantage of lightening restrictions on the structural parameters
in order to obtain positive growth rates in models with capital accumulation.
Agent i's utility function is speciﬁed as follows:
ui (ci, 1− li) ≡ [civi (1− li)]1+εi / (1 + εi) if εi ≤ 0, εi 6= −1 (46)
ui (ci, 1− li) ≡ ln ci + ln vi (1− li) if εi = −1 (47)
The parameter −1/εi is still interpretable as elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution in consumption. In addition, we need to deﬁne (ﬁrst and second or-
der) elasticities of leisure utility: εvi ≡ v′i (1− li) (1− li) /vi (1− li) and εv′i ≡
v′′i (1− li) (1− li) /v′i (1− li). The KPR functional form (46) implies:[
εi11 εi12
εi21 εi22
]
=
[
εi (1 + εi) εvi
1 + εi εv′i + εiεvi
]
(48)
Usual assumptions on preferences are maintained.
Assumption 4 (KPR) vi (1− li) is a continuous function on [0, 1], dif-
ferentiable as many times as needed, increasing and concave on (0, 1), that is,
εv′i ≤ 0 ≤ εvi . We further assume:
(1 + 2εi) εvi − εiεv′i ≤ 0 (49)
Assumption 4 deserves some comments. First, εv′i ≤ 0 ≤ εvi and εi ≤ 0
imply εi11 ≤ 0, εi22 ≤ 0, while (49) is equivalent to εi11εi22 ≥ εi12εi21. So,
concavity conditions (16) are met. Second, normality conditions (17) ensue
from εv′i ≤ εvi .
Let us now deﬁne Q ≡ (1− l0) (1− β + ρ)+ l (1− β + ρλ0)
(
εv0 − εv′0
)
. Ap-
plying Proposition 4 to KPR preferences, we make the bifurcation through which
cycles arise more explicit.
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Corollary 6 The system undergoes a ﬂip bifurcation at σ = σF > 0, if and
only if both the inequalities are satisﬁed:
2εv0 − εv′0 > (1− l0) (1 + β) /[ρ(l − l0)] (50)
− 1
ε0
<
(l − l0)
(
2εv0 − εv′0
)− (1− l0) (1 + β) /ρ
(l − l0) εv0 + (1− l0) (1 + β) +Q/2
(51)
Otherwise saddle-path stability prevails whatever σ > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We observe that, when preferences are KPR, the elasticities of labor supply
of impatient consumers (i ≥ 1) become zero, which implies in turn ξ˜ = 0.
Therefore, preferences of impatient agents play no role on local dynamics, as it
was the case under inelastic labor supply.
As seen above, a suﬃciently low intertemporal substitution in patient agent's
consumption (−1/ε0) is needed to recover instability and the occurrence of en-
dogenous cycles. This result is also in accordance with what happens under
exogenous labor supply. However, by direct inspection of (51), we notice that a
higher degree of concavity of v0 (patient agent's utility of leisure) also promotes
macroeconomic instability. Indeed, taken εv0 as given, the left-hand side of (50)
and the right-hand side of (51) increase with the degree of concavity −εv′0 , mak-
ing both the inequalities and instability more likely. Conversely, since the elas-
ticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage ξ0 = (1− l0) /
[
l0
(
εv0 − εv′0
)]
decreases with −εv′0 , a more elastic labor supply of the patient agent promotes
saddle-path stability and dynamic convergence.
9 Homogeneous utilities
One of the most popular classes of non-separable preferences is represented by
homogeneous utility functions. In contrast to most existing papers, we don't
reduce the analysis to homogeneity of degree one, but we allow the utility func-
tions to have a degree less or equal to one.
The degrees of homogeneity and concavity are closely related.17 The former
plays a key role on the stability properties, as the latter did in the KPR case.
That's why taking into account a degree less than one matters.
Assumption 5 (homogeneity) The utility function ui (cit, 1− lit) is ho-
mogeneous of degree νi ≤ 1, for every i = 0, . . . , n.
Restriction νi ≤ 1 is needed to ensure the concavity and meet the second
order conditions for intertemporal maximization. We also notice that Cobb-
Douglas and CES utitlity functions satisfy Assumption 5, being homogeneous
of degree one.
17The higher the degree of homogeneity, the lower the degree of concavity.
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As in the KPR case, the patient agent matters more than the others in
the stability analysis. We will show, precisely, that the steady state becomes
a saddle point as soon as the patient agent's degree ν0 becomes close to one,
while, in contrast, the occurrence of cycles requires low degrees of homogeneity.
In this connection, we need an additional notation.
si ≡ ui1ci/ui ∈ (0, 1) (52)
will denote the agent i's consumption share in total utility and εi ≡ ciui11/ui1 <
0 the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, while −1/εi will
represent, as usual, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption.
Under Assumption 5, the homogeneity property and normality between con-
sumption and leisure entail, respectively:18
si < νi ≤ 1 and εiνi + (1− νi) si < 0 (53)
for every i = 0, . . . , n. Under properties (53), Proposition 4 is explicitly revis-
ited.
Proposition 7 Proposition 4 still holds, where now:
ξ˜ = −
n∑
i=1
li (1− li)
l − l0
(
1 +
νi − si
εiνi + (1− νi) si
)
(54)
ξ˜
∗
= − 1− l0
(1− ν0) (l − l0)
[
ρ+ ε0
ν0 − s0
ε0ν0 + (1− ν0) s0
]
< 0 (55)
ξ˜
∗
+ κ = ξ˜
∗
+
ρ
1 + β
[
1− ρ+ (1− β) (1 + l − l0)
2 (1− ν0) (l − l0)
]
(56)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 7 gives necessary and suﬃcient conditions for saddle-path sta-
bility, instability and deterministic cycles. In order to appreciate the economic
intuition behind, we provide suﬃcient conditions for saddle-path stability in
terms of the most signiﬁcant parameter, the degree of homogeneity.
Corollary 8 Under Assumption 5, if the degree of homogeneity of the patient
agent is suﬃciently high, that is,
ν0 > 1− ρ+ (1− β) (1 + l − l0)2 (l − l0) (57)
while the impatient agents' elasticities of intertemporal substitution in consump-
tion are suﬃciently large, that is,
−1/εi > 1/ (1− si) (58)
for every i = 1, . . . , n, then the steady state is a saddle point (there is no room
for cycles).
18See the proof of Proposition 7 in the Appendix
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Condition (58) is somewhat close to those we got above (see for instance, the
separable case with elastic labor supply). Condition (57), which involves only
the patient consumer's degree of homogeneity, is more puzzling and deserves
great regard.
The next corollary stresses the prominence of (57), by asserting that restric-
tions (58) become superﬂuous to get saddle-path stability, when ν0 lies in a
suﬃciently small neighborhood of one.
Corollary 9 Under Assumption 5, when the capitalist's degree of homogeneity
ν0 is suﬃciently close to one the steady state is saddle-point stable and cycles
are deﬁnitely ruled out.
In particular, when the preferences of the patient agent are homogeneous of
degree one, saddle-path stability prevails.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollaries (8)-(9) undoubtedly show how the degree of homogeneity in the
patient agent's utility matters to determine the stability properties of the econ-
omy. Homogeneous utilities of degree one, so popular in economic literature,
have a very speciﬁc impact on dynamics and must be questioned on the ground
of robustness. In this model, they imply dynamic convergence whatever the
other parameter values, whereas stability is no longer ensured as soon as the
degree of homogeneity lowers.
Eventually, we observe that lower the degree of homogeneity, higher the
degree of concavity, more likely instability and cycles. We recover some results
already found in the separable case (namely, under elastic labor supply) and in
the KPR case. In both the cases the impact of concavity through the elasticity
of labor supply emerges as dominant feature.
10 Interpretation
An economic intepretation of a bifurcation is a somewhat diﬃcult task. In
order to simplify this task, while preserving the main mechanism behind the
emergence of cycles and the role of labor supply, it is not unworthy to compare
the cases with elastic and inelastic labor supply.
The patient agent's budget constraint is the valuable information we need
to start the analysis (see also Becker and Foias (1994)). In equilibrium, the
constraints reduces to
c0t + kt+1 −∆kt = rtkt + wtl0t ≡ It
The economic intuition is based on the (possibly) negative response of the in-
come It to an increase in kt.
23
As announced, we ﬁrst assume an inelastic labor supply: for simplicity, each
agent supplies one unit of time. Therefore, l0t = 1 and lt = 1 + n. Using (18)
and (19), we obtain:
It = f
(
kt
1 + n
)
+ f ′
(
kt
1 + n
)
nkt
1 + n
(59)
We notice immediately that, in the case of a representative agent (n = 0), It
is increasing in kt. On the contrary, when consumers are heterogeneous (n > 0),
It can decrease in kt, if f ′ (kt/ (1 + n)) kt lowers enough, which in turn requires
a suﬃciently weak capital-labor substitution, i.e., σ < 1 − s. In this case, the
future capital stock kt+1 decreases if the consumption c0t is not too sensitive
to changes in income It. This explains why a suﬃciently weak elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption is necessary for the occurrence of
cycles and instability and why concavity promotes cycles too.
Keeping in mind the basic mechanism, we can tackle the case of endogenous
labor supply which makes more complex the income response to a change in
capital.
The crucial question of the paper, we cannot get round, is why, in many
cases, endogenous labor promotes saddle-path stability? Under elastic labor
supply, the income It becomes:
It = f (at) l0t + f ′ (at) at
n∑
i=1
lit (60)
with lt =
∑n
i=0 lit and at = kt/lt. All the labor supplies lit (i = 0, 1, ..., n)
depend on the real wage which is increasing in kt. Therefore, an increase in kt
generates two new eﬀects: on the one hand, an impact on It through at, that is,
through f (at) and f ′ (at) at; on the other hand, an impact through the weights
l0t and
∑n
i=1 lit.
In order to evaluate the ﬁrst eﬀect, we observe that lt is an implicit func-
tion of kt and c0t (equation (26)), and the capital-labor ratio is as well: at =
kt/l (kt, c0t) ≡ a (kt, c0t). Then, using (73) (see the Appendix), we obtain:
∂a/a
∂k/k
=
σ (a) /s (a)
σ (a) /s (a) + λ0ξ0 + (1− λ0) ξ˜
As soon as λ0ξ0 + (1− λ0)ξ˜ > 0, this elasticity is less than one,19 which means
that, following an initial increase in kt, the endogenous labor response reduces
the increase of the capital-labor ratio and possibly dampens oscillations along
non-monotonic capital paths.
In order to evaluate the second eﬀect (on the weights l0t and
∑n
i=1 lit),
we consider the at's appearing directly in equation (60) as ﬁxed. Under this
restriction, the derivative of (60) with respect to kt is given by:
k
[
f (a)λ0ξ0 + af
′ (a) (1− λ0) ξ˜
] s (a)
σ (a)
∂a
∂k
(61)
19We notice that, when labor supply is inelastic, the capital-labor ratio is equal to k/ (1 + n).
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The second eﬀect also promotes stability if the income It increases with kt
through the weights l0t and
∑n
i=1 lit. So, oscillations and endogenous cycles
are dampened if (61) is positive, which depends on the sign of the term into
the brackets and the sign of ∂a/∂k. Both of them are positive if ξ˜ is not too
negative:
ξ˜ > −min
{
λ0ξ0
s (a) (1− λ0) ,
λ0ξ0 + σ (a) /s (a)
1− λ0
}
The addition of both the eﬀects can explain why, when the slope of the impa-
tient agents' labor supply is not too negative or the degree of concavity of leisure
utility is suﬃciently weak, endogenous labor supply promotes saddle-path sta-
bility. One immediately sees that the same conclusion holds for the patient
agent, through ξ0.
Finally, let us notice that, as was the case under inelastic labor supply,
endogenous cycles and instability occur more likely if c0t is little sensitive to
variations in kt.20 This requires a suﬃciently weak elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption, a high degree of concavity of consumption utility
or a degree of homogeneity suﬃciently less than one.
11 Conclusion
We have addressed the question of saddle-path stability and dynamic conver-
gence in an economy with heterogeneous consumers and elastic labor supply. In
line with Becker (1980), Becker and Foias (1987, 1994), Hernandez (1991) and
Sorger (1994), we have also supposed that agents face borrowing constraints,
representing a kind of market incompleteness.
As in the case of inelastic labor supply, a state with a positive amount of
capital in the hands of some impatient household cannot be stationary. This
means that in a neighborhood of a steady state, the capital stock is wholly owned
by the most patient agent, whereas the others consume their labor income.
Focusing on such equilibria, we ﬁrst establish the existence and uniqueness of
the steady state.
At a second stage, we analyze the local dynamics to address the saddle-path
stability and convergence issues. In particular, we focus on the role of preferences
on the stability properties of the steady state and the occurrence of endogenous
cycles. As was the case in economies with inelastic labor supply, instability and
endogenous cycles require suﬃciently weak capital-labor substitution. However,
now, the taste for leisure and the impatient agents' behavior have a great in-
ﬂuence on dynamics. We ﬁrst derive conditions for saddle-path stability and
the occurrence of ﬂip bifurcation under general preferences in consumption and
leisure. Then, we apply our results to particular classes of preferences widely
employed in macrodynamics.
In order to ﬁx ideas, it is not unworthy to recover the representative agent as
a limit case. We ﬁnd that the steady state is always a saddle point, in contrast
20We observe that, under elastic labor supply, c0t also aﬀects l0t and, consequently, lt and
at.
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to De Hek (1998) who obtains persistent ﬂuctuations. However, his analysis is
somewhat misleading, because founded on questionable assumptions such as the
lack of normality in consumption and leisure.
Coming back to the model with heterogeneous consumers, we make explicit
the role of preferences on dynamics, by presenting three classes of utility func-
tions commonly used in economic literature.
When preferences are separable in consumption and leisure, the introduc-
tion of elastic labor supply promotes saddle-path stability if the impatient agents
easily smooth consumption over time. If conversely, their intertemporal substi-
tution in consumption is too weak, there is room for instability and deterministic
cycles.
When preferences are KPR (King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988)), the impatient
agents' utility functions cease from having any inﬂuence on dynamics, while only
the patient agent's tastes matter. An elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption which is not too weak and a leisure utility which is not too concave
are needed to ensure convergence, whatever the technological parameters.
Eventually, when preferences are homogeneous, the degree of homogeneity of
the patient agent's utility naturally emerges as crucial parameter. In particular,
we prove a somewhat intriguing result: when the degree is close to one, saddle-
path stability prevails.
12 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The ith agent maximizes the intertemporal util-
ity function (2) under the sequences of budget constraints (3) and borrowing
constraints (4). The ﬁrst order conditions reduce to the Euler equations:
ui1 (cit, 1− lit)
ui1 (cit+1, 1− lit+1) ≥ βiRt+1, with equality if kit+1 > 0 (62)
the consumption-labor arbitrages: ui2 (cit, 1− lit) = ui1 (cit, 1− lit)wt, the bud-
get constraints (3) (now binding), and, eventually, the individual transversality
conditions: limt→+∞ βtiui1 (cit, 1− lit) kit+1 = 0.
As seen above, heterogeneity in time preference leads the more patient agent
to hold the entire capital stock near a stationary solution. More precisely,
equation (62) becomes R ≤ 1/βi in a neighborhood of the steady state. But,
since β0 > βi for i > 0, the equilibrium interest factor will prevail, will be the
cheapest rental factor:
R = min {1/βi}ni=0 = 1/β0 (63)
(assumption (1)), and 1/βi > R at the stationary equilibrium for i ≥ 1. Around
the steady state, ui1 (cit, 1− lit) /ui1 (cit+1, 1− lit+1) > βiRt+1, for i ≥ 1, ac-
cording to equations (62) and (63). Firms borrow the cheapest capital from the
individual i = 0, while individuals i ≥ 1 end up to hold no capital: k0t > 0 and
kit = 0 for i ≥ 1.
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The capitalist's equation (62) (i = 0) will hold with equality, jointly with the
consumption-leisure arbitrage (9), the budget constraint (10) and the transver-
sality condition.
The impatient agents' budget constraints (3) simplify to (11), because now
kit = 0 (for i ≥ 1). The consumption-leisure arbitrages (9) still hold, where cit
is given by (11). Eventually, the transversality conditions are satisﬁed.
Inequalities (13) must hold at every period in order to ensure the capitalistic
distribution as an intertemporal equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we prove that l0 (w, c0) is well deﬁned from:
ϕ0 (l0, c0) = w (64)
where ϕ0 (l0, c0) ≡ u02 (c0, 1− l0) /u01 (c0, 1− l0). We observe that under As-
sumption 1, liml0→1− ϕ0 (l0, c0) = +∞. ϕ0 crosses at least once w because,
by hypothesis, liml0→0 u02 (c0, 1− l0) /u01 (c0, 1− l0) < w. Moreover, under
Assumption 2, ∂ϕ0 (l0, c0) /∂l0 = − (u022 − u012u02/u01) /u01 > 0. Then, ϕ0
crosses w only once and the solution of (64) is unique.
Second, we prove the existence of the function li (w) for i ≥ 1. We need to
solve the implicit equation:
ϕi (li) = w (65)
where, as above, ϕi (li) ≡ ui2 (wli, 1− li) /ui1 (wli, 1− li). Given w, we have,
under Assumption 1, limli→0+ ϕi (li) = 0 and limli→1− ϕi (li) = +∞. By con-
tinuity, at least a solution of equation (65) exists. In addition, since ϕ′i (li) =
[ui12ui2/ui1 − ui22 + w (ui21 − ui11ui2/ui1)] /ui1 > 0 under Assumption 2, the
function ϕi crosses w only once. The solution li (w) of equation (65) is thus
unique.
Proof of Proposition 3. As a preliminary result, we observe that, under
Assumption 1, the labor supply of each consumer is always smaller than one,
i.e., li < 1 for all i ≥ 0. Now, notice that a steady state is deﬁned by:
r (k/l) = 1/β −∆
l = l0 (w (k/l) , c0) +
n∑
i=1
li (w (k/l))
c0 = (r (k/l)− δ) k + w (k/l) l0 (w (k/l) , c0)
Under Assumption 3, there exists a unique solution k/l ≡ α to the ﬁrst equation,
where α > 0 is a constant. The wage w (k/l) = w(α) is constant too and the
functions li (w) as well (denote them l¯i). Finally, the agent 0's labor supply is
deﬁned by:
u02 ((1/β − 1) k + wl0, 1− l0) = wu01 ((1/β − 1) k + wl0, 1− l0) (66)
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and determines a continuous function l0 = lˆ0 (k), with k = αl. Since the sum of
continuous functions is continuous,
λ (l) ≡ lˆ0 (αl) +
n∑
i=1
l¯i (67)
is continuous. A steady state is a solution to the equation l = λ (l), where l
belongs to (0, 1 + n). Using our preliminary result, we deduce that λ (0) < 1+n.
Moreover, we have:
λ′ (l) = −α1− β
β
(
w +
c0
1− l0
ε022 − ε012
ε011 − ε021
)−1
< 0,
according to (17). Thus, there is a unique solution l∗ = λ (l∗), which is a steady
state and determines the other variables, namely k∗ and l∗0.
Local Dynamics. In order to get local information on dynamics, we linearize
the dynamic system (27)-(28) around the steady state. Equations (27) and (28)
become, respectively:
− u012 (1− l0)
u01
l0
1− l0
l0ww
l0
(
wkk
w
+
wll
w
lkk
l
)
dkt
k
+
[
u011c0
u01
− u012 (1− l0)
u01
l0
1− l0
(
l0c0c0
l0
+
l0ww
l0
wll
w
lc0c0
l
)]
dc0t
c0
+
[
u012 (1− l0)
u01
l0
1− l0
l0ww
l0
(
wkk
w
+
wll
w
lkk
l
)
− βr
(
rkk
r
+
rll
r
lkk
l
)]
dkt+1
k
−
[
u011c0
u01
− u012 (1− l0)
u01
l0
1− l0
(
l0c0c0
l0
+
l0ww
l0
wll
w
lc0c0
l
)
+ βr
rll
r
lc0c0
l
]
dc0t+1
c0
= 0
(68)
and([
∆+
(
1 +
rkk
r
+
rll
r
lkk
l
)
r
]
k + wl0
(
wkk
w
+
wll
w
lkk
l
)(
1 +
l0ww
l0
))
dkt
k
+
(
rll
r
lc0c0
l
rk + wl0
[
l0c0c0
l0
+
wll
w
lc0c0
l
(
1 +
l0ww
l0
)]
− c0
)
dc0t
c0
− kdkt+1
k
= 0
(69)
To achieve the reduction in elasticities, we need those of labor supply. We
know that l0 = l0 (w, c0), l∗i = li (w) and l = l (k, c0) are respectively given by
(9), (23) and (25). Total diﬀerentiating (9), we get:
εw0 ≡ l0ww
l0
=
1− l0
l0
1
ε012 − ε022 ≡ ξ0 > 0 (70)
εc0 ≡ l0c0c0
l0
=
1− l0
l0
ε021 − ε011
ε022 − ε012 < 0 (71)
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Totally diﬀerentiating (23), we obtain:
ξi ≡
l∗′i (w)w
li
=
1 + εi11 − εi21
εi21 − εi11 + (εi12 − εi22) li/ (1− li) (72)
for i = 1, . . . , n, while, totally diﬀerentiating (25), we ﬁnd:
lkk
l
=
λ0εw0 +
∑n
i=1 λiξi
λ0εw0 +
∑n
i=1 λiξi + σ/s
(73)
lc0c0
l
=
λ0εc0σ/s
λ0εw0 +
∑n
i=1 λiξi + σ/s
(74)
where λi is the individual labor share in total labor supply. Substituting the
elasticities (70), (71), (73) and (74) in equations (68) and (69), we get a reduced
system:
− (1 + ρx) dkt+1
k
+ [λ0εc0 (1 + ρx)− z (ε011ε022 − ε012ε021) /ε012] dc0t+1
c0
= −dkt
k
+ [λ0εc0 − z (ε011ε022 − ε012ε021) /ε012] dc0t
c0
−β dkt+1
k
= [ρ (1− λ0 − λ0εw0) /z − 1] dkt
k
+ [ρλ0 (1− εc0 [1 + (1− λ0 − λ0εw0) /z]) + 1− β] dc0t
c0
where
x ≡ 1− ε022/ε012 (75)
z ≡ σ/s+ ξ (76)
Afterwards, we evaluate the Jacobian matrix J of system (27)-(28) at the
steady state:[ − (1 + ρx) λ0εc0 (1 + ρx)− z (ε011ε022 − ε012ε021) /ε012
−β 0
]−1
[ −1 λ0εc0 − z (ε011ε022 − ε012ε021) /ε012
ρ (1− λ0 − λ0εw0) /z − 1 ρλ0 (1− εc0 [1 + (1− λ0 − λ0εw0) /z]) + 1− β
]
We deduce the trace T and the determinant D of the Jacobian matrix using
(75) and (76).
Proof of Corollary 6. We apply the results obtained in Proposition 4. Using
(48), the critical values ξ˜
∗
and κ are explicitly computed:
ξ˜
∗
=
1− l0
l − l0
ρ− ε0
(1 + 2ε0) εv0 − ε0εv′0
(< 0) (77)
κ =
ρ
1 + β
(
1 +
Q
2 (l − l0)
[
(1 + 2ε0) εv0 − ε0εv′0
]) (78)
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Since ξi = 0 for all i ≥ 1 (expression (72)), we have also ξ˜ = 0. As high-
lighted in Proposition 4, a ﬂip bifurcation generically arises if and only if
σF = s (1− λ0)
(
ξ˜
∗
+ κ
)
> 0, which requires ξ˜
∗
+ κ > 0. Using (49), (77)
and (78), this last inequality holds if and only if (50) and (51) are satisﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 7. Since the utility function ui is homogeneous of
degree νi, ui (µci, µ (1− li)) = µνiui (ci, 1− li) for any positive real number µ.
Homogeneity implies some well-known properties: si1 + si2 = νi, εi11 + εi12 =
νi − 1 = εi21 + εi22 and
si1
si2
=
νi − 1− εi22
νi − 1− εi11 (79)
for i = 0, . . . , n, where si1 ≡ ui1ci/ui and si2 ≡ ui2(1 − li)/ui are the con-
sumption and leisure shares in total utility and εij1 and εij2 the elasticities of
marginal utilities (deﬁnition (15)).21
In our analysis, the key variables are the consumption share in total utility
si1 and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (−1/εi11).
Simplifying notation as follows: εi ≡ εi11 and si ≡ si1, we get si2 = νi− si and:
εi12 = νi − 1− εi (80)
εi21 =
si
νi − si (νi − 1− εi) (81)
εi22 = νi − 1− si
νi − si (νi − 1− εi) (82)
The ﬁrst inequality in (53) ensues from si1, si2 ∈ (0, νi). From (80), (81) and
(82), we compute other expressions of interest appearing in ξ˜
∗
, ξ˜
∗
+ κ and
ξ˜ ≡∑ni=1 λiξi/ (1− λ0), that is in equations (32), (33) and (72), respectively:
εi11 − εi21 = [εiνi + (1− νi) si] / (νi − si) = εi22 − εi12 (83)
εi11εi22 − εi12εi21 = − (1− νi) (εi11 − εi21) (84)
Normality conditions (16) and (17) immediately entail the second inequality in
(53). Substituting (80)-(84) into (32), (33) and (72), we eventually obtain (54),
(55) and (56).
Proof of Corollary 8. Saddle-path stability requires σ > σF . Then σF < 0
or, equivalently ξ˜ ≥ ξ˜∗ + κ, implies convergence. Replacing (54), (55) and (56)
21These properties are derived using the Euler's law (ui1ci + ui2 (1− li) = νui) and the
fact that the marginal utilities are homogeneous of degree νi − 1. Equation (79) is obtained
diﬀerentiating the Euler's law w.r.t. to ci and 1 − li and noticing that the cross derivatives
are equal.
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in ξ˜ ≥ ξ˜∗ + κ, we get
n∑
i=1
li (1− li)
(
1 +
νi − si
εiνi + (1− νi) si
)
≤ 1− l0
1− ν0
(
ρ+ ε0
ν0 − s0
ε0ν0 + (1− ν0) s0
)
(85)
− ρ
1 + β
(
l − l0 − ρ+ (1− β) (1 + l − l0)2 (1− ν0)
)
A suﬃcient condition for the left-hand side in inequality (85) to be nega-
tive is 1 + (νi − si) / [εiνi + (1− νi) si] < 0 for every i, that is (58) under
(53). A suﬃcient condition for the right-hand side to be positive is l − l0 −
[ρ+ (1− β) (1 + l − l0)] / [2 (1− ν0)] < 0, that is (57) under (53).
Proof of Corollary 9. We notice that, under (53), as ν0 tends to 1−, the left-
hand side of inequality (85) in the Proof of Corollary 8 gets a ﬁnite value, while
the right-hand side goes to +∞. Then inequality (85) asymptotically holds.
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